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KANT AND SWINBURNE ON REVELATION 
Kelli S. O'Brien 
Immanuel Kant's position on special revelation is a matter of debate. Here I dis-
cuss Kant's position in detail and compare it to that of Richard Swinburne. I 
examine both philosophers' views on the assertability of special revelation, its 
contingency, whether it is necessary, the possibility of error, and appropriate 
methods of interpretation. I argue that, like Swinburne, Kant finds belief in spe-
cial revelation to be acceptable, even beneficial, under certain circumstances. 
Introduction! 
"Any religion which goes beyond the boundaries of unassisted rea-
son is not merely gratuitous; it is also necessarily immoral." Allen 
Wood on Kane 
"I think that Kant regarded himself as one of those people introduced 
to the pure religion of reason by the vehicle of special revelation." 
John Hare3 
Immanuel Kant's position on special revelation is anything but clear. His 
comments on the matter appear so mixed that Allen Wood and John Hare 
are able to produce ample quotations to support their radically opposing 
views. In this article, I will attempt to untangle those comments and to 
come to a clearer understanding of Kant's position on special revelation. 
To help in that endeavor, I will be examining the views of Richard 
Swinburne, a philosopher who both acknowledges his debt to Kant and is 
unambiguously positive about the possibility and benefit of special reve-
lation. Swinburne will serve as a point of comparison, a standard by 
which to evaluate Kant's views. 
One of the controversies surrounding Kant's views touches on his free-
dom to write explicitly. Kant's work was censored, and not only did he 
want to have his work published, he expressed a moral obligation to obey 
the laws of the state and the requirements of the censor (R 7). He would 
therefore not have been free to express, explicitly, a view such as Allen 
Wood attributes to him. Indeed, Wood describes Kant's comments as 
"coy."4 Yet while Kant was unable to speak freely, we must assume that 
what he did say, he did also mean. Arguments from silence are weak at 
any stage in history. We must compose our account out of the material we 
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do have, not out of what we do not.' 
In the preface to the second edition of Religion Within the Limits of 
Reason Alone, Kant states that revelation is able to include the religion of 
reason, while the religion of reason cannot include whatever is historical in 
revelation. He describes the two as concentric circles, with the religion of 
reason being the inner circle. Here he, perhaps, implies that the religion of 
reason is also revealed. In his lectures, he makes the statement explicitly: 
"Revelation is either external or inward. An external revelation can be of 
two kinds: either (1) through works, or (2) through words. Inward divine 
revelation is God's revelation to us through our own reason" (LPT 160, d. 
PrR 36). That is, reason is a form of revelation, what Christians often call 
general revelation. External revelation is special revelation, revelation of 
divine works or will in history, in a particular place and time, to a particu-
lar person or group of people. 
John Hare defines "special revelation" as that part of the larger circle 
which does not contain the smaller circle, the revelation of reason. 6 
However Kant always speaks of a special or external revelation as some-
thing which can include the revelation of reason and as having value par-
ticularly when it incites someone to make use of reason to come to pure 
concepts of God (LPT 161, R 79). Therefore, I will use the term in that 
sense: special or external revelation is that which comes to humanity in a 
manner other than the simple use of reason. It may contain concepts which 
reason is perfectly able to derive on its own. Thus the definition consists 
not of content but of the manner of its original transmission: through rea-
son or through some other means. When I wish to refer to that part of the 
larger circle which does not contain the smaller, I will use the term "histori-
cal revelation" or speak of "statutory" laws or doctrine. 
1. Kant The Assertability of Special Revelation 
Kant never tires of reminding his readers that the transcendental realm is 
beyond the reach of experience and thus beyond our knowledge. We have 
no way to know that God exists or to do more than invent concepts regard-
ing his nature (PR 530). Kant applies this difficulty to the verifiability of 
external revelation: "For if God should really speak to a human being, the 
latter could still never know that it was God speaking. It is quite impossible 
for a human being to apprehend the infinite by his senses, distinguish it 
from sensible beings, and be acquainted with it as such" (CF 63). Even if one 
were personally to hear a voice from the heavens, one cou ld not be certain. 
There is always the possibility of a mistake in appearances (R 175). Kant 
clearly held we could never know that a piece of purported external revela-
tion actually is revealed by God. 
On the other hand, Kant held that external revelation was possible, 
within the power and rights of God (LPT 162; R 165, 122). External revela-
tion was something which reason could neither confirm nor deny. 
So how is one to respond? Allen Wood argues that Kant believes it to be 
impermissible for us to accept external revelation. "We might interpret the 
principle of thinking for oneself more strictly as saying that a belief is not 
permissible unless it is held on grounds which actually are universally valid 
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for any rational being who possesses them."7 He points out that Kant 
believed there were no possible grounds for external revelation which were 
universally valid. Thus, Wood concludes, "any religion which goes beyond 
the boundaries of unassisted reason is not merely gratuitous; it is also neces-
sarily immoral."8 That a belief is permissible only on appropriate grounds is 
supported in Religio1l: "one cannot by any means start with unconditioned 
belief in revealed propositions (in themselves hidden from reason) ... " (R 
152). One may not believe willy-nilly. That is an abuse of reason. 
John Hare however finds fault with Wood's strict interpretation. He 
states that Kant merely argues that we cannot know a claim about external 
revelation to be true. "It no more follows that we should not believe in 
supernatural revelation than that we should not believe in God.'" Hare is 
arguing that valid grounds for belief are more inclusive than the valid 
grounds for knowledge. Surely this is correct. Kant declares that while 
knowledge of God is impossible, faith in him through practical grounds is 
unshakable, and moreover, necessary (LPT 40-41). We may, rather must 
accept faith in God on practical grounds. 
Kant did not limit appropriate belief in unknowable things to practical 
belief in the ens realissimum. He holds that it is impossible for us to know 
our own moral disposition, much less that of another, because this disposi-
tion is noumenal, not phenomenal. Nevertheless, with reference to the 
Ideal Man, he states, "For in the absence of proofs to the contrary it is no 
more than right to ascribe the faultless example which a teacher furnishes 
of his teaching ... to the supremely pure moral disposition of the man him-
self" (R 59). That is, even though we cannot know our own moral disposi-
tion, we may ascribe the supremely pure moral disposition to a particular 
person (himself the subject of purported external revelation), in the 
absence of proofs to the contrary. 
Surely then, something less than knowledge that God himself is speaking 
to us is required for belief in external revelation. What conditions are nec-
essary? Kant repeatedly mentions two factors: miracle and morality. 
Kant frequently refers to miracles as authentication of special revelation. 
For example, he says "the lzistoriCilI introduction of such a religion [a religion 
of reason] may be accompanied and adorned by miracles in order to 
announce the end of the earlier religion, which was made authoritative by 
miracle. It does so to announce itself as the true religion and the fulfillment 
of the old. '" The person who taught us this new religion may be and have 
acted in every way as a miracle. The historical account of him may also be 
a miracle, supersensible revelation" (R 79). For historical belief, the doc-
trine of the supermundane nature of that person "would indeed stand in 
need of verification through miracles" (R 120). 
Such miracles however would have to be verified through historical 
inquiry and scholarship, and Kant's hopes for such an inquiry are low. He 
states that at the time of the event in question, the resurrection, the 
"learned public," namely the Romans, did not look into the new religion at 
all until a generation after it occurred and even then did not look into its 
beginnings. Therefore the early history of the movement is obscure. The 
miracles are not verified (R 120-121, d. 154-155). 
Moreover, miracles have, in general, limited value for authentication of 
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special revelation. Mracles can be either theistic or demonic in origin. We 
could determine that a miracle was not theistic if it authenticated a com-
mand which was immoral. We cannot be sure of the opposite however 
since "the evil spirit often disguises himself, they say, as an angel of light" 
(R 82). When dealing with miracles, reason has, quite plainly, little power 
to investigate. Kant goes further to ascribe belief in miracles to superstition 
(R 48), and ascribes to the reasonable person a rather skeptical attitude 
toward miracles (R 80, cf. 123). In the Conflict of the Faculties, Kant con-
cludes that "No historical account can verify the divine origin of such a 
writing"( CF 64). That is, miracles can never be compelling grounds for 
asserting external revelation. 
Here, though, Kant does not simply throw up his hands. He goes on to 
describe what is authenticating for external revelation: "The proof can be 
derived only from its tested power to establish religion in the human heart 
and, by its very simplicity, to reestablish it in its purity should it be cor-
rupted by various (ancient or modern) dogmas" (CF 64). That is, external 
revelation is verified by its agreement with the religion of reason and by its 
ability to awaken that religion in the human heart. 
While Kant admitted that the religion of the Ideal Man may have been 
introduced with miracle, it is no longer in need of such external aids. "But 
from now on it is able to maintain itself on rational grounds" (R 79). 
Historical belief about Christ would require miracles, but practical belief 
about him is self-verifying (R 120, cf. 150). He declares that to need mira-
cles to verify practical belief about the Ideal Man is to display a culpable 
lack of moral faith (R 56, 79). 
Thus the inability of miracles to authenticate special revelation is cov-
ered by the conformity of that revelation with the religion of reason. While 
verifying the miracles of both the Old Testament and the New is beyond 
our reach, the New Testament has the "great advantage" of coming not as 
a statutory but "moral religion, and as thus entering into the closest rela-
tion with reason so that, through reason, it was able of itself, without his-
torical learning, to be spread at all times and among all peoples with the 
greatest trustworthiness" (R 154-155, emphasis added). In The Conflict of the 
Faculties, he concludes that the Bible does in fact meet the requirement he 
posed for it: 
The Bible contains within itself a credential of its (moral) divinity that 
is sufficient in a practical respect-the influence that, as the text of a 
systematic doctrine of faith, it has always exercised on the hearts of 
human beings, both in catechetical instruction and in preaching. This 
is sufficient reason for preserving it, not only as the organ of univer-
sal inner rational religion, but also as the legacy (new testament) of a 
statutory doctrine of faith which will serve us indefinitely as guiding 
line. (CF 64) 
Here he does not make an unqualified endorsement; he does not state that 
the Bible, as a whole, is straight from the mouth of God. He goes on to say 
however that "the divinity of its moral content" compensates for whatever 
is human in its narrative, and thus, "that the Bible deserves to be kept, put 
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to moral use, and assigned to religion as its guide just as if it is a divine rev-
elation" (CF 65). Though Kant cannot grant that we can know a revelation 
is from God, he does grant that there can be sufficient practical grounds to 
accept such a claim. Moreover, he grants that there are such grounds for 
accepting the Christian Bible as revelation. 
The Contingent 
Kant's acceptance of the Christian Bible as a credible form of special revela-
tion is not the end of the question. What, we must ask, is the value of such 
a revelation? Is belief in it morally required? Are its historical and statutory 
aspects binding? Is it necessary for true religion? 
It would be difficult to overstate the importance for Kant of universality. 
He calls universality "the most important mark of truth" (R 100). He says 
that "the token of the true church is its universality; the sign of this, in turn, 
is its necessity and its determinability in only one possible way" (R lOS, 
emphasis added). Quite obviously all external revelation falls short of this 
ideal. It is always particular, always contingent. 
Kant recognizes the validity of statutory commandments, that is com-
mandments not knowable by reason a priori. He admits that, in addition to 
being served by genuine morality, God may wish to be served in other 
ways as well (R 165). He states that the statutory doctrine of the New 
Testament will serve indefinitely as a guiding line (CF 64). But notice that 
statutory doctrine is a "guiding line" merely, not an "infallible rule" or 
something like it. Nor is it universally binding: 
For statutory legislation (which presupposes a revelation) can be 
regarded merely as contingent and as something which never has 
applied or can apply to every man, hence as not binding upon all men 
universally. Thus, "not they who say Lord! Lord! but they who do the 
will of God," they who seek to become well-pleasing to Him not by 
praising Him (or His envoy, as a being of divine origin) according to 
revealed concepts which not every man can have, but by a good 
course of life, regarding which everyone knows His will-these are 
they who offer Him the true veneration which He deserves. (R 95) 
In addition, every service rendered to God which is not directly moral 
must indirectly serve moral ends (R 165). All others must be abandoned. 
For Kant, the statutory never takes precedence over the practical. The 
universal always has priority over the particular, the moral over the non-
moral. To reverse the priority is fetishism, and true enlightenment is to 
know this proper priority (R 165, 167). 
Christoiogy 
If the universal always takes precedence over the contingent, what about 
Christ? How can Kant endorse the Christian scriptures as revelation, con-
taining as they do, references to Christ's saving work for humanity in histo-
ry, and at the same time hold the contingent to be of lesser value than the 
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universal? To make sense of this, we must look briefly at Kant's 
Christology. 
Kant repeatedly refers to the Ideal Man as an example for us. He is the 
archetype of the human well-pleasing to God, which we are to imitate (R 
55-58). We are to "elevate ourselves to this ideal of moral perfection" (R 54, 
emphasis added). We are saved by "practical faith in this Son of God"; 
only in imitation of this exemplar are we to consider ourselves worthy of 
divine approval (R 55). 
Christians have always considered Christ as an example, but Kant takes 
this idea further than traditional theology has allowed. He states that if this 
Ideal Man were to have powers we do not, his value as an example for us 
would be lessened. If temptation and transgression were impossible for 
him, his nature would be so different from ours that he could no longer be 
a model for us. Thus we have no reason to attribute to him any sort of 
miraculous or divine birth (R 57-58). In addition, the Ideal Man is an idea, 
an idea which comes down from heaven to humanity, to be sure, but it is 
an idea which is "completely real, in its own right, for it resides in our 
morally-legislative reason" (R 54-55). The objective reality of such a person 
is unnecessary. "Even though there had never existed an individual who 
yielded unqualified obedience to this law, the objective necessity of being 
such an one would yet be undiminished and self-evident" (R 56). Thus the 
Ideal Man is to have no more power for morality than you or I, and in fact, 
he need never have existed. 
Traditionally, doctrine regarding the divinity and reality of Christ has 
been tied not to Christ as examplar but to Christ as provision for atone-
ment. How, then, does Kant handle atonement? Following his discussion 
of the Ideal Man, Kant acknowledges our need for atonement and discuss-
es the manner in which that need might be met. In so doing he uses 
Christian terminology to discuss a revolution which every person effects in 
herself for herself. While we change our hearts from the evil to the good dis-
position, we change from the old person to the new. In that process we suf-
fer the punishments which were due to the old person, the guilty person. 
And this moral disposition which in all its purity (like unto the purity 
of the Son of God) the man has made his own--or, (if we personify 
this idea) this Son of God, Himself-bears as vicarious substitute the 
guilt of sin for him and indeed for all who believe (practically) in 
Him; as savior He renders satisfaction to supreme justice by His suf-
ferings and death; and as advocate10 He makes it possible for men to 
hope to appear before their judge as justified. (R 69) 
That is, Kant takes the narrative and terminology of the Christian story, and 
rather than making Christ our savior and atonement through vicarious sub-
stitution, Kant makes the moral disposition, merely personified in Christ, our 
savior and advocate. As we take on the moral disposition, we make atone-
ment for ourselves. We ourselves must effect this change because guilt is 
not transmissible, like financial debt; guilt is something "which only the cul-
prit can bear and which no innocent person can assume even though he be 
magnanimous enough to wish to take it upon himself for the sake of anoth-
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er" (R 66). Christ not only did not remove our sins by his sufferings and 
death, it has always been impossible for him to do so. Thus Christ need be 
no more than an idea as an example and as our atoning sacrifice. That idea 
we have in practical reason. All that is of value in Christ is universal. 
Kant is by no means so satisfied with this account as to think it the 
answer to every question. He repeatedly refers to the possibility that we 
may not be able to effect, totally, our own atonement and that God may be 
required to do something on our behalf. If so, reason tells us that one who 
has done everything in his power to satisfy his obligation may hope that 
whatever is lacking will be supplied by God "in some way or other." Reason 
does not give the manner, and the manner is not important; it is perhaps 
even beyond our ability to comprehend (R 159, d. 134). Kant goes on to ask 
who is the one with greater faith, the one who trusts that God will do what 
is necessary or the one who absolutely insists on knowing how it is done? 
Clearly his answer is the former (R 160). 
Outside these parameters, expressing faith in Christ does no good what-
soever. He tells us that believing the incomprehensible does not make us 
better people. While the historical accounts of Christianity may be entirely 
accurate, miracles in themselves, "it is essential that, in the use of these his-
torical accounts, we do not make it a tenet of religion that the knowing, 
believing, and professing of them are themselves means whereby we can 
render ourselves well-pleasing to God" (R 79-80). Only practical faith in the 
moral disposition, personified in the Son of God, is effective and saving faith. 
The Necessity of Revelation 
For Kant, the historical accounts of Christianity become a teaching tool, a 
manner of transmitting the universal saving faith of practical reason. In his 
account of the atonement, Kant uses the narrative and terminology of 
Christianity to discuss the saving work each person does on his own behalf. 
At several points he calls external revelation a "vehicle" for the religion 
of reason. Statutory doctrines and laws are the vehicle for that which is 
moral (R 95, 97). External revelation occurs first, in time, to demonstrate to 
us what we would otherwise have been able to conclude on the basis of 
reason (R 143, 97). Scripture still remains because of its manner of commu-
nicating, the best way of making the religion of reason comprehensible to 
the unlearned (R 152-153, 169). Kant declares that the Bible is the "most 
effective organ for guiding human beings to their temporal and eternal 
well-being ... " (CF 63).1l 
Nevertheless, scripture remains a tool, and belief in its claims to external 
revelation is not required of anyone. We have already drawn attention to 
Kant's claim that universality is the most important mark of truth and that 
external revelation can never lay claim to universality (R 100). It can never, 
therefore, lay claim to apodictic certainty. He further argues that it is wrong 
to compel others to believe something about which they cannot be certain. 
Clergy who have themselves become convinced of the truth of a special rev-
elation may not force others to make the same confession (R 175-176). One 
may reasonably suppose that Kant held that if it is immoral for clergy to 
require this, it may also be immoral for God. Special revelation, "being his-
542 Faith and Philosophy 
torical, can never be required of everyone" (R 99). Most particularly, it can-
not be required of the learned, who see all the problems attendant on con-
firming it (I{ 169). His language could not be stronger on this point: 
there arise so many doubts [about an external revelation] ... that to 
adopt such a belief as this, subjected as it is to so many controversies 
(however sincerely intentioned), as the supreme condition of a uni-
versal faith alone leading to salvation, is the most absurd course of 
action that can be conceived of. (R 169) 
That which is not universal is also not required because it is not neces-
sary. While Kant does not dare to specify the means by which God might 
help people to become what they ought, his "reason has just as little insight 
as to how something not lying in reason but transcending all reason could 
be necessary to the welfare of mankind" (LPT 162-163). We need to know 
what we ourselves need to do for our own salvation, but it is not essential 
for us to know what God does for us (R 47). 
Thus external revelation is a vehicle for the religion of reason. It may 
introduce the religion of reason, as did, Kant intimates, Christ. It may be a 
teaching tool for the unlearned. It may be a guide to all, indefinitely. It 
remains however merely a vehicle. As such, it must be able to cease (R 
126). Nothing in it that is not universal can be necessary, and thus all that is 
contingent in it must be able to pass away. He defines the true church as 
the community of the universal religion of pure reason. The church mili-
tant is that church struggling to disencumber itself from the vehicle of his-
torical religion; the church triumphant is the church after that battle has 
been won (R 106). The ultimate goal of the true church is to have nothing in 
it of the contingent. Its doctrine and laws are to be entirely and thoroughly 
universal doctrines and laws of reason. 
Kant appears to waver on whether this change will ever take place, 
whether the battle will ever actually be won. At one point he writes tri-
umphantly: 
Hence a necessary consequence of the physical and, at the same time, 
the moral predisposition in us, the latter being the basis and the inter-
preter of all religion, is that in the end religion will gradually be freed 
from all empirical determining grounds and from all statutes which 
rest on history and which through the agency of ecclesiastical faith 
provisionally unite men for the requirements of the good; and thus at 
last the pure religion of reason will rule over all, "so that God may be 
all in all." (R 112) 
Kant however is not always so confident. Just as he writes that the vehicle 
ought to cease and that we ought to labor to set pure religion free from its 
shell, he writes also, "Not that it is to cease (for as a vehicle it may perhaps 
always be useful and necessary) ... " (R 126). Revelation may always be sub-
jectively necessary; because of "a peculiar weakness of human nature, pure 
faith can never be relied on as much as it deserves, that is, a church cannot 
be established on it alone" (R 94). 
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Kant may sigh when he writes it, but he admits that people want some-
thing "sensibly tenable" and that a holy book will always be subjectively-
thought not objectively-necessary (R 100, 123). In light of that, and for the 
sake of the unlearned, we ought always to teach the historical narrative as 
inspiring, but also that true religion consists not in considering what God 
has done for us, but what we are to do to make ourselves worthy of God's 
assistance (R 123). 
The Possibility of Error 
Kant allows the acceptance and teaching of the Bible as special revelation, 
including treating its statutory elements as a guide. What, then, is his posi-
tion on error in the Bible? Does he think its historical and statutory ele-
ments could contain error? 
Clearly he does. "For even the authors of sacred Scripture, being 
human, could have made mistakes (unless we admit a miracle running 
continuously throughout the Bible) ... " (CF 66). Error may creep in not only 
because of the humanity of its authors, but also because of the humanity of 
its audience. Scripture is a vehicle "designed to fit in with the creed which 
a certain people already held about [moral faith]fI (CF 44). Scripture was 
written by and for a specific group of people who already held a certain set 
of beliefs about the law of Moses, and scripture is in continuity with those 
beliefs. The writers' own beliefs are influenced by that tradition (for exam-
ple, Paul wrote about the doctrine of election because of his previous 
beliefs [CF 661), and the writers attempt to introduce and make credible the 
religion of reason to an audience committed to that tradition (R 118, 150). 
So its statutory elements can contain error. What about moral elements? 
According to Kant, whatever is moral is known to reason. Thus j an error in 
the moral aspect of the Bible must be something which contradicts practi-
cal reason. Kant touches on this possibility when in Religion he discusses 
whether or not it is moral to execute a heretic (R 174-175). He states that on 
rational grounds "that it is wrong to deprive a man of his life because of his 
religious faith is certain .... " He does acknowledge however the "most 
remote possibility" of an exception: it is wrong unless "a Divine Will, made 
known in extraordinary fashion, has ordered it otherwise." As a possible 
instance of this, he refers to the story of Abraham being ordered by God to 
"slaughter his own son like a sheep." However, if such a tenet of the 
Divine Will is made available to us only through historical documents, 
which are written, passed on, and interpreted by people, we can never be 
certain of it. Furthermore the same holds even if the order appears to come 
directly from God-flit is at least possible that in this instance a mistake has 
prevailed." Thus, Kant holds that it is possible for God to order something 
contrary to what appears to us to be morally certain, but neither Abraham 
nor anyone else can ever be certain that God has in fact issued such an 
order. His conclusion is that we are never to act according to special revela-
tion when it commands disobedience to a certain moral duty. While Kant 
gives us a clear course of action to follow, he opens up the possibility that 
even in its moral contents, scripture can contain error. 
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Interpretation of Revelation 
Despite the enthusiastic claims of certain Reformers, the Bible is not self 
interpreting, and Kant's acknowledgment that it may contain errors under-
scores the problem of right reading. Kant makes frequent reference to the 
fact that scripture must be interpreted and to the manner in which inter-
pretation is to be done. He notes that there will always be a need for schol-
ars versed in the ancient languages and in the historical period (R 104-105). 
However such matters, while necessary, are secondary (R 104, CF 66). The 
primary matter is interpreting what a scriptural text has to say about 
morality. 
If a people has been taught to revere a sacred Scripture, the doctrinal 
interpretation of that Scripture, which looks to the people's moral 
interest-its edification, moral improvement, and hence salvation-is 
also the authentic one with regard to its religion: in other words, this 
is how God wants this people to understand His will as revealed in 
the Bible. (CF 67, d. R 102) 
We are to interpret scripture so that it serves as a moral guide and aid to 
the people. Thus the religion of reason serves as the highest principle of all 
scriptural exegesis (R 100, 102). 
We are to interpret scripture in line with the universal religion of pure 
reason even when such an interpretation seems, and may actually be, 
forced (R 101). He offers a number of reasons for the acceptability of this 
procedure. First, he notes that authoritative texts have always been so 
interpreted, citing allegorical interpretation of scripture in the church and 
of the poets in ancient Greek philosophy. He supports his position with 
scriptural texts. That scripture is to serve as a moral guide he finds estab-
lished in 2 Tim 3:16: "All scripture given by inspiration of God is profitable 
for doctrine, for reproof, for improvement, etc." (R 102). From the antithe-
ses in the Sermon on the Mount (You have heard it said ... , but I say ... , Matt 
5:21ff), he declares it obvious that interpretation according to the religion of 
reason is necessary, because literal interpretation (identified with scriptural 
scholarship) may lead to wrong conclusions (R 148). As for authorial inten-
tion being twisted by a forced interpretation, he states that we need only 
admit the possibility that the original author intended such an interpreta-
tion. For, he states, the historical element in the text is indifferent and "we 
may do with it what we like," even when what we like is forcing on it an 
interpretation which seems alien to the text. 
He provides many examples of interpretation based on reason, through-
out Religion. An extended example is provided in his discussion of the Son 
of God and the idea of the moral disposition (Book Two, Section One), 
where he takes Christological terminology and narrative to describe how 
each person reconciles himself with God. He uses a similar technique to 
interpret the story of the Fall (R 36-38). Early on, Kant cites Paul in Eph 
6:12, "we wrestle not against flesh and blood (the natural inclinations) but 
against principalities and powers-against evil spirits [sic]." While some-
one reading the text literally might assume that Paul is describing beings 
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beyond the world of sense and so something that is beyond our knowl-
edge, Kant declares that is not Paul's meaning. Paul intended "only to 
make clear for practical use the conception of what is for us unfathomable" 
(R 52). That is, Paul makes clear for our moral benefit the reality of our 
inl'isible enemy, radical eviL which is equally our enemy whether it comes 
from within or without. For Kant, scripture is not to be interpreted literally. 
It is to be interpreted according to reason, even when such interpretation is 
forced. 
2. Swinburne 
In Revelation: From Metaphor to Analogy, Richard Swinburne argues for the 
possibility of divine revelation. Using that work, I will discuss Swinburne's 
views in each of the categories discussed for Kant, and in the conclusion 
make comparisons between them. 
The Assertability of Special Revelation 
For Richard Swinburne, revelation in generaL and Christian revelation in 
particular, is something someone may rationally assert. 
Swinburne acknowledges that if there is no significant prior probability 
of Christian doctrines, then one must be very skeptical of Christian revela-
tion. 12 Swinburne argues however that there is prior probability for such 
revelation, and he spends much of the book drawing that out. He begins 
with evidence for God's existence, which he has assessed elsewhere and 
which he concludes is sufficient, though not overwhelming. l3 He then out-
lines what God might do on behalf of human beings and how God might 
reveal himself to us. Swinburne's account of this prior probability looks 
very much like what Christian doctrine teaches, for instance that God 
might become incarnate and live on our behalf a perfect life in order to 
offer us a means of atonement.14 At the close of his discussion, he states that 
"there is some a priori reason to suppose that God will reveal to us those 
things needed for our salvation."15 Swinburne does see significant prior 
probability of Christian doctrine, and thus some prior probability of 
Christian revelation. 
But even supposing prior probability, certainly not every purported 
revelation is actual. What sort of tests are we to use to determine that 
something is revealed? How much evidence is necessary? 
Let's begin with the latter question. Swinburne states that if there is evi-
dence that God exists and that he would reveal matters to us, then the evi-
dence required to conclude that a purported revelation is actual is less than 
what would be required without such prior evidence.16 In any case, we 
need not be overwhelmed by the evidence before legitimately committing 
ourselves to belief. In fact, he states that there is something positive in com-
mitting oneself without certainty: 
If it is on balance, probable, but no more than probable, that a human 
has discovered the way to Heaven, then he will manifest his commit-
ment to the goal of Heaven above all things by pursuing it over a 
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period of time when there is some doubt whether his quest will be 
successful. Such pursuit will involve a more total commitment to 
Heaven-indicate more definitely that that is the goal he chooses 
above all-and so thus also be more worthy of reward .... So there is a 
priori reason for supposing that the revelation which God provides 
will ... not be completely evident even to those who have found it. '? 
Here and elsewhere he implies that having a "posterior probability on that 
evidence of more than 1/2" is sufficient. 18 The standard is not certainty. All 
that is necessary for reasonable assertion is that the evidence makes the 
revelation probable. 
Swinburne can set such a standard because avoidance of error is not his 
primary purpose. He does not state, as do some, that it is best to avoid hav-
ing wrong beliefs, rather that it is "good to have true beliefs on important 
matters."'9 For example, he states that when we make decisions about the 
laws of nature, we do so based on available evidence. We could be (and 
historically have been) wrong about these laws. A reasonable person how-
ever "goes by the available evidence" both in making decisions about nat-
ural laws and, by implication, on the genuineness of a purported revela-
tion.20 The reasonable person need not wait until a matter is certain before 
believing it. She may, indeed, make errors, but that does not appear to be 
of much moment to Swinburne (and that it ought to be of as much moment 
as it is to some is by no means certain). Swinburne's emphasis on having 
right beliefs, rather than avoiding wrong ones, lessens the amount of evi-
dence he requires for rational belief. 
Nevertheless, some evidence is required. He establishes a prior proba-
bility for revelation in general and certain Christian doctrines in particular. 
That being done, what evidence could show us that a purported revelation 
is on balance probable? 
Swinburne proposes internal and external tests. Internal tests examine 
the content of the revelation; external tests examine the circumstances 
under which it was given. Briefly, the internal tests are: 
1. The content must be necessary for our deepest well-being, including: 
moral truths; details about what God is like and has done for us which we 
need to apply moral truths; and information about the afterlife which we 
need to encourage US.21 
2. The content must be true, as far as we are able to determine. It must 
not contain material that is certainly immoral. It must not contain, as part 
of its central message, factually incorrect information on history or predic-
tions which prove to be false."" Perhaps some portion of it is known to be 
true when the purported revelation is examined. In the 20th century, pre-
dictions made about the first century can be assessed for truth or false-
hood. Perhaps the examiner finds out later that the content was true. For 
example, a first century examiner finds that a significant prediction does in 
fact come true, or a 20th century examiner finds that a way of life which 
initially seemed pointless proves to be exceedingly valuable.21 
3. Any significant revelation will contain information we are unable to 
verify. Therefore, truth in what we can verify will be evidence in favor of 
the truth of what we cannot. The best of this sort of evidence will be content 
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which predicts something only God could know or do. That is, if a purport-
ed revelation contains a prediction that God will intervene in history or 
nature and that prediction subsequently proves true, this will be significant 
evidence in favor of the rest of the content of the purported revelation.24 
External evidence is: 
1. The character and behavior of the messenger. The messenger must be 
someone who is "generally good" and trustworthy. The messenger's will-
ingness to suffer and even die rather than to deny the message is also evi-
dence in its favor?5 
2. The authentication of the revelation by a miracle.26 For example, he 
states, "bringing to life a prophet crucified for saying certain things is par 
excellence vindicating that message, declaring it to be true."27 
While Swinburne will not himself give a final assessment of the evi-
dence (which he believes is best done by historians), he does go so far as to 
state that the Christian revelation makes a stronger claim to be revelation 
than the writings of the non-theistic religions, Islam, or even Judaism." For 
Christian revelation to be confirmed as revelation, historical evidence for 
the resurrection is absolutely necessary. Because, he states, there is prior 
reason to think that such an event could occur, the historical evidence need 
not be as strong as it otherwise might. Though he does not vouchsafe to 
give a detailed assessment of the historical evidence, he names several 
pieces of historical evidence which are not much in dispute, including the 
willingness of the disciples to die for the message they proclaimed, and it is 
clear that he personally finds the evidence to be adequate.29 
The Con ting1'il t and Christoiogy 
Universality does not have the importance for Swinburne that it had for 
Kant. Whereas Kant elevated to highest place that part of revelation which 
could be known to all, Swinburne believes that the deepest sort of revela-
tion tells us things that none of us can know: "For revelation seeks to tell us 
deep things that we cannot find out for ourselves-and it would be a fairly 
thin revelation if its only role was to suggest things that we could immedi-
ately check."311 
Part of the important material about which revelation informs us is 
what means God has provided for atonement, something which is, in 
Swinburne's understanding, a contingent matter. We "need historical 
information about how God provided an atonement, and practical infor-
mation about how we can plead it."'! 
Because that must be revealed to us, and there have been many periods 
and many different cultures on the earth, God could choose to reveal this 
information to every culture in every time, or God could choose to reveal it 
to one culture at one time and to give people of that culture the opportuni-
ty of transmitting the revelation to people of other cultures. Because there 
ought to be only one atonement and because revelation of that atonement 
is best given in connection with the event, it seems best that there be just 
one revelation, in one culture and one century.32 
Swinburne sees in this contingency, not the scandal of particularity, but 
the generosity of God in allowing us to participate in our salvation and to 
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help our neighbor participate in it." God, in the contingency of his revela-
tion, gives us what Swinburne calls the "opportunity" and "privilege" of a 
share in the responsibility of teaching each other about God. Swinburne 
considers participation and mutual help to be of high value. 
The Necessity of Revelation 
On Swinburne's account, revelation is always needed. Whereas Kant 
expresses caution about professing knowledge on matters which are 
beyond the range of reason, Swinburne emphasizes the importance of hav-
ing true beliefs on important subjects. God and the afterlife are tremen-
dously important subjects and are both beyond the reach of reason." We 
need to know certain moral truths and how to apply them, which without 
revelation would be obscure and difficult for us.'s Revelation would not be 
fully adequate if it contained only what could be checked by reason. He 
writes, "If our need for revelation is as great as I suggested in Chapter 5, it 
cannot be so easily dispensed with."36 
Swinburne does not comment on belief in revelation being required of 
anyone. Rather, he speaks of what would be sufficient warrant to believe it. 
He does not discuss what is required of those who live in times or places to 
which special revelation is unknown or of those who through no fault of 
their own have received only a presentation of special revelation which is 
not credible or even of those who have had special revelation presented to 
them in a compelling manner. So, while he emphasizes the importance of 
revelation in general, he does not state the consequences for the various 
groups of people who do not believe it. 
Perhaps because Swinburne speaks of believing confirmed revelation as 
something "good" and "important," rather than "necessary" or 
"required," necessity is not something he claims for it. In the absence how-
ever of more explicit comments, it is difficult to ascertain whether or not he 
finds belief in special revelation necessary for salvation. 
The Possibility of Error 
Swinburne divides error into two levels of severity, both of which are con-
tained in the Christian Bible. 
The first level is error which is part of the language used to communi-
cate the message, but which is not part of the message itself. It is error 
mixed in with the presuppositions of the person or community expressing 
the message. This level of error is not a problem. The revelation is to be 
judged on its intended message; errors which are part of the expression of 
that message but not part of the content are to be disregarded. Swinburne 
cites as examples, false scientific presuppositions that the earth is "flat, 
square, and stationary."3; 
The second level of error is more problematic. At this level, the error is a 
part of the actual content of the message. There are genuine conflicts in the 
Christian Bible, for example between the "rough justice" of Judges and the 
non-violence promoted in the Gospels. 3s While the core of the Old 
Testament is worthy of respect, "[wlhat however the modern world has 
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become far more conscious of is that some parts of the Old Testament can-
not be treated in this way; for they state (and not merely presuppose) his-
torical falsities, or they represent God as behaving immorally."'" This sort 
of error is, indeed, consequential. What is to be the response to it? 
Swinburne's answer is not entirely clear, and appears inconsistent. His 
first comments on the matter are given in his chapter on the tests for reve-
lation. He states: 
Generally evidence for and against the truth of the prophet's teaching 
must be weighed in the same way as evidence for and against the 
truth of any other body of claims .... But in this case lafter sifting out 
erroneous presuppositions which are part of the expression but not 
content of the message], any falsity at all is enough to dismiss the 
whole: earthly witnesses in a criminal trial can make a few mistakes 
without their testimony as a whole being regarded as worthless, but 
a prophet purporting to have a message from God must be assessed 
by more stringent standards.'o 
That is, the presence of any genuine error, including the errors of historici-
ty and representations of God acting immorally which he states are in the 
message of the Old Testament, would prove that the message in which 
they are contained is not genuine revelation. 
Swinburne however does not reach this conclusion in his discussion of 
the Christian Bible. In particular, he does not make that assertion following 
his admission that the Old Testament contains such difficulties. Rather, he 
concludes that such elements are to be interpreted metaphorically. He jus-
tifies this move on a historical basis. The Church Fathers, in canonizing the 
Old Testament, considered it to be interpreted in light of the New, so that 
"any parts of the Old Testament which could not be taken straight or his-
torically had to be taken in a purely metaphorical sense, a sense forced on 
the book, not bv considerations of the need to make sense of the biblical 
book taken on its own, but by the need to make sense of it as a part of a 
Christian Scripture."'! This sort of interpretation would be required on 
what he terms a "strong view" of inspiration.42 
He provides yet another position, based on a weaker view of inspira-
tion. In this view, the human authors who are the vehicles of divine inspi-
ration are "less than fully pliable. They were not fully open to divine truth, 
and allowed some small amount of falsity on important matters to infect 
Scripture."43 The same problem could have affected those who created the 
canon. In this weaker view of inspiration however our response to the 
error is the same as it is for the stronger view: a metaphorical interpretation 
of the difficulty.44 
Swinburne mentions the strongest and weakest positions on error in the 
space of four pages. On page 210, he writes that a purported revelation is 
genuine if "none of it was probably false." On page 213, "I have claimed 
that there is scope in a revelation for some error and so for some correction 
of error." Unfortunately, he does not discuss the relationship between the 
two statements, and they appear to be in contradiction. Perhaps he intends 
for his readers to accept one or the other of them, but not both. Such an 
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intention however is certainly better stated than left implicit. Another pos-
sible resolution comes from additional qualifiers to his statement that the 
revelation must have no probable errors. Perhaps only certain elements of 
it cannot contain errors. Perhaps errors are to be charged to it only after it 
has been interpreted by the Church and its inconsistencies have been treat-
ed. It would be well for Swinburne to be explicit on this point. 
Interpretation of Revelation 
Swinburne finds value in an uncertain revelation-it affords opportunity 
for its adherents to demonstrate a greater commitment, worthier of 
reward. He finds a similar value in uncertainty of expression. If the words 
of the revelation are taken as the very words of God, then future genera-
tions would find it difficult to remove presuppositions from their expres-
sions which applied only to the culture to which the words were spoken. 's 
Future generations would have their hands tied. Instead, there is some-
thing to be said for a revelation in which God or his messenger speaks to 
others, and they write down the message in their own words. Instead of 
one monolithic voice, the revelation is a combination of many voices, 
recording the revelation in different ways, "overlapping, stressing different 
aspects of revelation, and occasionally contradicting each other."46 Such a 
revelation would afford a wide scope for interpretation and for creatively 
reapplying the revelation to new situations. 
This is, in fact, the sort of revelation we have. In consequence, we are 
always in the process of interpreting and reinterpreting it for our own 
time. Christianity is always being refined.'7 
For Swinburne, the community determines meaning. "The meaning of a 
sentence is a public thing, determined by the publicly accessible criteria of 
the meanings of words and sentence forms in the language and how con-
text selects among those meanings; not a private thing, determined by the 
intention of the speaker."4S The public which determines the meaning of 
Christian revelation is the Christian church. In authenticating Jesus' teach-
ing by the resurrection, God authenticated the teaching that the Church 
would be "the vehicle of his teachings" and "thereby guaranteed that its 
interpretation would be basically correct."49 
Recognizing that the Christian Church has split repeatedly, Swinburne 
spends much of Chapter 8 discussing which church, if any, has the best 
claim to the title "best continuer" of the society Jesus founded, that is 
which church is the "true Church." While he suggests the Roman Catholic 
Church as a candidate, he also states that there may be no single "best con-
tinuer."5o In that case, only interpretations which are agreed to by all 
churches with reasonable claims to continuity with the original Church 
would be authoritative.s1 
Swinburne provides detailed procedures for interpreting the text, and 
describing them in any detail would go beyond the scope of this paper. A 
few points however are particularly noteworthy. Swinburne recommends 
that we read the Bible in three concentric circles: the smallest unit (e.g., a 
pericope or poem or other literary unit), the individual book (e.g., Matthew 
or Isaiah), and the Bible as a whole.52 At each level, the context is different, 
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and that context will affect meaning. Reading the Bible as a whole partic-
ularly affects meaning, because it changes the ultimate author from the 
human author of each individual book to God.54 
When one reads the Bible as a whole, with God as the ultimate author, 
then one deals with seeming contradictions within the books as one would 
do with any single book written by a human author: by attempting to har-
monize the two readings, if necessary reading one or the other of the con-
tradictory passages metaphorically.55 However, unless a metaphorical 
reading is forced on the text by its context, it is best to read the text in the 
most natural or literal manner. 56 
In interpreting scripture, the Church need not limit itself to deductive 
interpretation, but may develop its understanding by inductively making 
explicit what is only implicit in the text.5' For example, deriving a doctrine 
of the Trinity from biblical texts is quite appropriate. 58 
For Swinburne, what might be considered authorial intention, say from 
the historical-critical viewpoint, may be helpful in understanding a text, but 
it does not detemzine a text's meaning. This is so for two reasons. First, mean-
ing is determined by the community, not by the intentions of the speaker or 
writer. For example, the reading conventions of Jews in the first century 
determine whether a passage in the Old Testament was messianic and 
whether or not Jesus fulfilled that prediction; the intentions of its original 
author are not the ultimate limits of a text's meaning. 59 This is all the more 
true when one views the ultimate author of scripture as God, not the human 
author."" He uses the example of Rom 1:4: Christ was "declared to be the son 
of God with power, according to the spirit of holiness, by the resurrection of 
the dead." Paul may have had a low Christology, in which Christ was some-
thing less than God. He may have believed that Christ was made the Son of 
God at the resurrection. However Paul did not use a word which means 
specifically and only "made," rather he used the word "declare" (opti;;ro), 
which could mean either "made" or "recognized as." Paul "was inspired by 
God to write things whose meaning was a little different from what he sup-
posed." 61 That is, though Paul's understanding of Christ may have been dif-
ferent from the author of the Fourth Gospel, God inspired Paul to write in 
such a way that the meaning of his sentence is in harmony with John 1. What 
Paul himself thought is not determinative of meaning. 
Conclusion 
Having done the groundwork for a comparison, we find that Kant and 
Swinburne have much more in common in their views on revelation than 
their reputations would lead one to expect. Both recognize the necessity of 
special revelation. Swinburne recognizes that we need it because we need 
to know matters beyond the scope of reason in order to make good choices 
in life. Kant recognizes the power of revelation to speak in the language of 
the people and the security the tangible form of a holy book provides to 
people who are not wholly satisfied with ethereal reason. Kant and 
Swinburne both find it rational to accept a tested revelation and provide 
similar tests-namely, miracle and conformity with moral reason. 
However they weight these tests quite differently. For Kant, conformity 
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with moral reason is the ultimate test, and miracle can be dispensed with. 
For Swinburne, revelation cannot be authenticated without miracle, and 
though revelation cannot condone what is certainly immoral, Swinburne 
spends very little time on the subject. Both Kant and Swinburne recognize 
that scripture may contain error, though Swinburne is equivocal here. Both 
permit the exegete to force an interpretation on the text, to compel the text 
to conform to the (legitimate) needs of the community. For Kant, the pur-
pose of interpretation is to encourage people in leading moral lives. 
Swinburne is concerned to create a dynamic, systematic theology, which is 
both appropriate for each generation and internally consistent. While both 
of them give a nod in that direction, neither is terribly concerned about the 
intentions of the human authors of scripture. Instead, they are concerned 
that the text be used effectively to meet the needs of the contemporary 
community. Both realize that, as radical as this may appear, it is nothing 
new; the Church has approached the scriptures this way from the begin-
ning. The critical similarity between them, though, is that they both recog-
nize that humans, because of their limitations, need revelation and that it is 
reasonable to believe a purported revelation if it passes certain tests. And 
in this, Kant goes beyond Swinburne in unequivocally asserting that the 
Christian Bible does indeed pass. 
Their common views however do not negate their differences. As one 
might expect, their differences are particularly telling. Swinburne is con-
cerned with authenticated interpretation via the Church, as a community, 
which preserves the original revelation through tradition. Kant is con-
cerned with individual autonomy and each individual's responsibility to 
decide for himself what to believe and how to read. Kant strongly opposes 
the sort of ecclesiastical power inherent in Swinburne's interpretive 
scheme. 
Kant values Christian scripture primarily because of its conformity, in 
his view, with the universal religion of reason. We get closer to its truth as 
we peel away from it whatever is beyond the reach of unassisted reason. 
For Kant, external revelation is an aid to internal revelation, the revelation 
of reason. Going back to his image of the concentric circles, the circle of 
external revelation is indeed the larger circle, but the only portion of that 
circle which is genuinely important is within the inner circle, the revelation 
of reason. The rest is mere "vehicle," or worse, dead weight. Swinburne 
concludes quite the opposite. He tells us that revelation is meant to tell us 
what is beyond the reach of reason, that is its purpose. 
Their difference here reflects their different attitudes toward the contin-
gent, the particular. For Swinburne, God's relationship with humanity is 
lived out in history. God provides for our atonement in history, in one cul-
ture in one century. God develops our understanding of him and of our 
relationship to him via a particular community in time. For Swinburne, to 
recognize this realization through history, this contingency, is merely to 
recognize the human situation, within, not outside of, time and culture. For 
Kant, the particular is a danger. It, by definition, is available only to some. 
If it is necessary for our salvation, then some go without what is necessary. 
How can a just God withhold what is necessary for someone's salvation? 
Kant is also concerned with what sort of beliefs can be justly required of 
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rational beings. One can never be certain that one is hearing a revelation 
from God. Even with the confirmation of the most extraordinary miracle, 
even if the host of heaven should appear, singing God's praises, there is 
always the possibility of error, of deception of some kind or other. Can 
belief in something uncertain be required? Kant answers emphatically no. 
In this particular issue, we see some of what is best and worst in both of 
them. Kant, a man of the Enlightenment, firmly believes in the capacity of 
human beings, as rational beings, to rise above the limitations of self and 
culture to reach the universaL That sort of optimism does not hold in our 
own period. Swinburne recognizes the limitations we all labor under. We 
are always subject to the contingent. There are very few universals of rea-
son or anything else, certainly not enough of them to make sound choices 
in life. Swinburne recognizes that we will always need God's external 
assistance to learn matters of great importance to us. Revelation is not just 
a method for teaching us what we could have figured out for ourselves. 
Revelation is a method of teaching us what we otherwise have no power to 
grasp and we very much need to know. 
But Swinburne, for all his enthusiasm for the goodness and importance 
of revelation, entirely neglects the question Kant so relentlessly asks: what 
about those who do not accept this revelation? Is accepting revelation nec-
essary for salvation? Swinburne cannot be excused from answering the 
question. It is still more a question of our own time than it was of Kant's. 
Christians and non-Christians alike ask the question. Official Church bod-
ies ask the question. That Swinburne does not is a glaring omission. His 
Christian philosophy cannot be called reasonably complete until he 
addresses the issue. 
Kant is concerned to make salvation available to everyone. He rightly 
recognizes the scandal of damning someone for eternity based on some-
thing or some lack which was not at all her fault. "The very man who has 
the temerity to say: He who does not believe in this or that historical doc-
trine as sacred truth, that man is damned, ought to be able to say also: If 
what I am now telling you is not true, let me be damned!" (R 178) Kant 
knows that the boldest of us would scarcely dare to make such a declara-
tion. But does that make necessary his conclusion that the true church will 
become the church triumphant only when it rids itself of everything in spe-
cial revelation which does not belong to the general revelation of reason? Is 
it not possible that the church will be truly triumphant when all its mem-
bers know, recognize, and celebrate what God has done for them in histo-
ry? Do Kant's arguments support his declaration that we cannot be held 
responsible for believing anything unless it is apodictically certain? Is God 
obligated to cater to the skeptic? Do we not also have an obligation to 
respond to whatever evidence God graciously permits us to receive? 
Indeed, as Kant points out, we ought to tremble to declare that others or 
we ourselves ought to be damned on the basis of particular historical 
beliefs. But still more ought we to tremble not to respond to God's gracious 
self-revelation. To see something of God and to turn away is dreadful 
indeed, something for which we cannot hope to excuse ourselves with 
protestations about apodictic certainty. From all that we are able to under-
stand of justice, if God is just, then he must provide for all people whatever 
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means are absolutely necessary for their salvation. However what is neces-
sary may be provided for us in the form of external revelation and particu-
lar historical beliefs. Furthermore, more than the minimum requirements 
may be available to particular people in time. God may make available to 
some a greater abundance of goodness, a greater abundance or earlier 
knowledge of means. God is well within the bounds of justice to require 
positive use of such means. "From everyone to whom much has been 
given, much will be required; and from the one to whom much has been 
entrusted, even more will be demanded" (Luke 12:48, NRSV). 
Yet, for all his reluctance to require acceptance of scripture of others, 
Kant's own acceptance of and respect for it is evident. Hare draws out how 
much Kant's pietistic upbringing provides the paradigm for his religion of 
reason.62 Kant evidently recognizes in scripture the Ideal Man. 
Kant remarks, dryly, that scripture is held in high respect most of all 
among those who do not read it (R 98). His frequent quotations of scripture 
indicate he is not one of those. Nor do his comments about the pure reli-
gion of reason drown out his comments about scripture's power to teach 
us about God or morality. 
At minimum, we may say that Kant holds that belief in revelation, as 
long as it does not conflict with practical reason and the moral disposition, 
is acceptable and beneficial: 
Whatever, as the means or the condition of salvation, I can know not 
through my own reason but only through revelation, and can incor-
porate into my confession only through the agency of an historical 
faith, and which, in addition does not contradict pure moral princi-
ples-this I cannot, indeed, believe and profess as certain, but I can as 
little reject it as being surely false; nevertheless, without determining 
anything on this score, I may expect that whatever therein is salutary 
will stand me in good stead so far as I do not render myself unwor-
thy of it through defect of the moral disposition in good life-conduct. 
In this maxim there is genuine moral certainty .... (R 177) 
But one may reasonably say more. Perhaps the analogy is best drawn from 
Kant's attitude toward the physico-theological proof. He cannot accept this 
argument as a proof. It does not answer all questions. Neither does he dis-
miss it. 
This proof always deserves to be mentioned with respect. It is the 
oldest, the clearest, and the most accordant with the common reason 
of mankind. It enlivens the study of nature, just as itself derives its 
existence and gains ever new vigour from that source. It suggests 
ends and purposes, where our observation would not have detected 
them by itself, and extends our knowledge of nature by means of the 
guiding-concept of a special unity, the principle of which is outside 
nature. This knowledge again reacts on its cause, namely, upon the 
idea which has led to it, and so strengthens the belief in a supreme 
Author that the belief acquires the force of an irresistible conviction. 
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It would therefore not only be uncomforting but utterly vain to 
attempt to diminish in any way the authority of this argument. 
Reason, constantly upheld by this ever-increasing evidence, which, 
though empirical, is yet so powerful, cannot be so depressed through 
doubts suggested by subtle and abstruse speculation, that it is not at 
once aroused from the indecision of all melancholy reflection, as from 
a dream, by one glance at the wonders of nature and the majesty of 
the universe-ascending from height to height up to the all-highest, 
from the conditioned to its conditions, up to the supreme and uncon-
ditioned Author. (PR 520) 
Such are Kant's views on an argument he rejects as a proof. It is reasonable 
to conclude that his views on scripture are similar. It teaches us. It enlivens 
reason. It, though empirical, is yet so powerful that it upholds reason, 
sometimes depressed through speculative doubts, and lifts it to the 
supreme and unconditioned Author. Kant clearly held that one may be 
introduced to the religion of pure reason through special revelation (R 79). 
Perhaps John Hare is right in his belief that Kant regarded himself as such 
an one.6l 
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